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automaton/tasks/complete/phase-scoped-prompts/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md
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Archive completed tasks, add cleanup commands, self-documenting dashboard UI
- Archive 79 completed framework-dev tasks from tasks/ -> tasks/complete/
- status.py: add --cleanup-done and --install-cleanup-schedule commands
- Add scripts/automaton-cleanup.sh for periodic task archiving
- Dashboard: rename 'Background' tab -> 'Agent', 'Cleanup' agent -> 'Completed Task Archiver', remove redundant group headers and pill badges, dim inactive agent placeholders
- .rules.md: add Self-Documenting UI Names rule
- New tests: test_cleanup_done.py, expanded test_app.py and test_task.py
2026-06-24 22:43:33 -04:00

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# Adversarial Bug Report: Phase-Scoped Prompts
## Deep Review
The ALLOWED/FORBIDDEN sections create hard boundaries that prevent phase-skipping. The user override resistance instructions give agents a standard refusal template. The orchestrate.md reduction from 493 to 143 lines is significant and removes state machine duplication.
## Potential Issues
1. **FORBIDDEN section is advisory only**: An agent that ignores the prompt can still perform forbidden actions. The enforcement relies on the agent following instructions. `status.py --validate-folder` catches violations after the fact, but cannot prevent them in real-time.
2. **Agent can fabricate APPROVED signal**: The approval gate says "wait for user approval," but a non-compliant agent could call `status.py --approve` itself without waiting. This is mitigated by the spec requirement that `--approve` is an explicit user action, but a truly adversarial agent could simulate it.
3. **decompose.md length**: At over 150 lines, decompose.md pushes against the prompt discipline target. Not a functional bug but a maintenance concern.
## Verdict: PASS — no security or logic flaws. Enforcement is prompt-based with status.py as a post-hoc check, which is the intended design.