Lap Tran
4a2301b077
CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
- Archive 79 completed framework-dev tasks from tasks/ -> tasks/complete/ - status.py: add --cleanup-done and --install-cleanup-schedule commands - Add scripts/automaton-cleanup.sh for periodic task archiving - Dashboard: rename 'Background' tab -> 'Agent', 'Cleanup' agent -> 'Completed Task Archiver', remove redundant group headers and pill badges, dim inactive agent placeholders - .rules.md: add Self-Documenting UI Names rule - New tests: test_cleanup_done.py, expanded test_app.py and test_task.py
17 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
17 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
# Adversarial Bug Report: Status Script
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## Deep Review
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The 980-line status.py is comprehensive. State machine transitions are correctly validated. Approval gates are enforced. Atomic writes prevent corruption. Error messages are clear and actionable.
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## Potential Issues
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1. **Audit Category 3 stub**: The git-based unauthorized modification check is stubbed. In projects that are git repos, the audit cannot detect code edits made during non-implement phases. This is a gap — an agent could edit code during research and the audit wouldn't catch it unless the artifacts reveal it.
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2. **`--same-session` heuristic is weak**: The 30-minute window for session detection is a best-effort heuristic. It cannot reliably distinguish sessions across agent restarts. The spec acknowledges this, but the implementation doesn't add much beyond mtime comparison.
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3. **No `--force` flag for coordinator overrides**: The multi-agent spec defines `--force` for coordinator force-transitions, but the current implementation returns "ERROR: unknown flag" for `--force`. This is expected to be added in the multi-agent-support task but a truly adversarial agent could use this gap.
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4. **Symlink attack on `.state.tmp`**: An attacker with filesystem access could create a symlink at `.state.tmp` pointing to a sensitive file, causing the atomic write to overwrite it. This is a local-privilege scenario, not a remote attack.
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5. **No rate limiting on `--create-task`**: A script could create thousands of task folders. Mitigation exists via kebab-case validation, but no limit on creation count.
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## Verdict: PASS — the audit stub is a known gap. No logic flaws that would compromise phase enforcement. |