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- Archive 79 completed framework-dev tasks from tasks/ -> tasks/complete/ - status.py: add --cleanup-done and --install-cleanup-schedule commands - Add scripts/automaton-cleanup.sh for periodic task archiving - Dashboard: rename 'Background' tab -> 'Agent', 'Cleanup' agent -> 'Completed Task Archiver', remove redundant group headers and pill badges, dim inactive agent placeholders - .rules.md: add Self-Documenting UI Names rule - New tests: test_cleanup_done.py, expanded test_app.py and test_task.py
15 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
15 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
# Adversarial Bug Report: Multi-Agent Support
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## Deep Review
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The multi-agent system is well-designed for file-system-based coordination. Single-agent mode has no overhead. Claim/release uses atomic writes. Work discovery correctly prioritizes tasks closer to completion.
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## Potential Issues
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1. **Agent identity is self-reported**: `--agent` is a command-line flag with no authentication. Any agent can claim to be any agent-id. In a trusted environment (single machine, same user), this is fine. In adversarial or distributed scenarios, this would need cryptographic signing.
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2. **Lock file race on NFS/Linux**: The atomic rename pattern (`.state.lock.tmp` → `.state.lock`) is atomic on local filesystems but may not be atomic on NFS. The spec explicitly scopes this out ("file-based locks are sufficient for local agent coordination").
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3. **Expired lock window**: Between lock expiry and overclaiming, there's a window where two agents could both see an expired lock and both try to claim. The atomic write pattern means only one wins, but the loser gets an error rather than a graceful retry message.
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4. **No lock inheritance on sub-task creation**: When the coordinator creates a sub-task via `--create-task`, the sub-task is unclaimed by default. The coordinator must explicitly claim it on behalf of an agent. This is correct behavior but could be surprising.
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## Verdict: PASS — the self-reported identity is a known design choice (trusted environment), not a security vulnerability in the intended threat model. |