CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
- actionable-phase-guidance: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete - harden-enforcement-layers: pre-push hook, install-hooks.sh, register-guards.sh, prompt pre-edit checks, harness contract update, install/update/upgrade script integration - plug-stale-task-hole: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete - port-pi-guard: pi dev guard plugin, package.json, register-guards integration All tasks passed bug_find, adversarial_bug_find, doc_review, and referee phases with PASS verdict.
16 lines
873 B
Markdown
16 lines
873 B
Markdown
# Adversarial Bug Report — harden-enforcement-layers
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## Attack Vectors
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1. **Hook bypass**: Can a user bypass the pre-push hook?
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2. **Symlink attacks**: Does `install-hooks.sh` follow symlinks unsafely?
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3. **Command injection**: Does `register-guards.sh` have injection vectors in its Python inline script or pi install call?
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## Findings
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- Pre-push hook can be bypassed with `--no-verify` (documented), but this is by design — it's a deterrent layer
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- `install-hooks.sh` uses `cp` not `ln -sf` — no symlink following risk
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- `register-guards.sh` passes `$OPENCODE_SOURCE` and `$PI_SOURCE` to Python/pi — these are hardcoded framework paths, not user input. Safe.
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- Python inline script uses `$OPENCODE_CONFIG` which could theoretically contain special chars, but this is a framework path from a controlled location
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## Verdict
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No exploitable vulnerabilities found.
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