Drive all 4 remaining tasks to completion through full lifecycle

- actionable-phase-guidance: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete
- harden-enforcement-layers: pre-push hook, install-hooks.sh, register-guards.sh, prompt pre-edit checks, harness contract update, install/update/upgrade script integration
- plug-stale-task-hole: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete
- port-pi-guard: pi dev guard plugin, package.json, register-guards integration

All tasks passed bug_find, adversarial_bug_find, doc_review, and referee phases with PASS verdict.

tasks/harden-enforcement-layers/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Adversarial Bug Report — harden-enforcement-layers
+
+## Attack Vectors
+1. **Hook bypass**: Can a user bypass the pre-push hook?
+2. **Symlink attacks**: Does `install-hooks.sh` follow symlinks unsafely?
+3. **Command injection**: Does `register-guards.sh` have injection vectors in its Python inline script or pi install call?
+
+## Findings
+- Pre-push hook can be bypassed with `--no-verify` (documented), but this is by design — it's a deterrent layer
+- `install-hooks.sh` uses `cp` not `ln -sf` — no symlink following risk
+- `register-guards.sh` passes `$OPENCODE_SOURCE` and `$PI_SOURCE` to Python/pi — these are hardcoded framework paths, not user input. Safe.
+- Python inline script uses `$OPENCODE_CONFIG` which could theoretically contain special chars, but this is a framework path from a controlled location
+
+## Verdict
+No exploitable vulnerabilities found.