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automaton/tasks/harden-enforcement-layers/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md
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CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
Drive all 4 remaining tasks to completion through full lifecycle
- actionable-phase-guidance: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete
- harden-enforcement-layers: pre-push hook, install-hooks.sh, register-guards.sh, prompt pre-edit checks, harness contract update, install/update/upgrade script integration
- plug-stale-task-hole: lifecycle artifacts + .state->complete
- port-pi-guard: pi dev guard plugin, package.json, register-guards integration

All tasks passed bug_find, adversarial_bug_find, doc_review, and referee phases with PASS verdict.
2026-06-16 07:28:45 -04:00

873 B

Adversarial Bug Report — harden-enforcement-layers

Attack Vectors

  1. Hook bypass: Can a user bypass the pre-push hook?
  2. Symlink attacks: Does install-hooks.sh follow symlinks unsafely?
  3. Command injection: Does register-guards.sh have injection vectors in its Python inline script or pi install call?

Findings

  • Pre-push hook can be bypassed with --no-verify (documented), but this is by design — it's a deterrent layer
  • install-hooks.sh uses cp not ln -sf — no symlink following risk
  • register-guards.sh passes $OPENCODE_SOURCE and $PI_SOURCE to Python/pi — these are hardcoded framework paths, not user input. Safe.
  • Python inline script uses $OPENCODE_CONFIG which could theoretically contain special chars, but this is a framework path from a controlled location

Verdict

No exploitable vulnerabilities found.