v2.0: state enforcement, project scoping, harness integration

State Enforcement (v2.0):
- .state file as single source of truth for task phase
- Approval gates for research, decomposition, design, test_design
- status.py --transition refuses illegal phase transitions
- status.py --validate-folder detects out-of-order artifacts
- status.py --audit checks all tasks for violations
- status.py --create-task is the only valid way to create tasks
- Pre-v2.0 tasks without .state are UNTRACKED -- all commands refuse them
- New --upgrade command bootstraps .state files for existing tasks

Project Scoping:
- --project flag added to all status.py commands across 16+ files
- _find_project_dir errors instead of silently falling back to ~/.automaton/
- --scope-check marks framework files OUT_OF_SCOPE when working on a project
- Dashboard handlers use stored project_root instead of re-detecting from CWD
- Prompts reference ~/.automaton/scripts/vram_detect.py (not {project}/.automaton/)

Harness Integration:
- status.py --can-edit now supports project-level checks (no --task required)
- --can-edit --file checks file scope without --task
- --json output for machine-readable harness integration
- opencode plugin (plugins/automaton-guard/plugin.ts) intercepts edit/write
- Git pre-commit hook (scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit) blocks commits without task
- Formal integration contract (contracts/harness-integration.md)

Other:
- upgrade.sh delegates to status.py --upgrade instead of manual heuristics
- Phase prompts reference --project {project} for multi-project scoping
- 200 tests passing (14 new)

tasks/state-file-enforcement/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Adversarial Bug Report: State File Enforcement
+
+## Deep Review
+The .state file format and transition rules are robust. Approval sub-states create a hard gate that cannot be bypassed via `--transition`. Atomic writes via tmp+rename prevent corruption on crash.
+
+## Potential Issues
+1. **Race condition on create**: Two concurrent `--create-task` calls for the same name could both pass the "doesn't exist" check before one creates the directory. The atomic rename pattern mitigates this for .state writes but not for `mkdir`.
+
+2. **Manual .state tampering**: A user or agent could directly edit `.state` to write an invalid phase name. `status.py` handles this ("Unknown phase" error), but the error path could be clearer about what phases are valid.
+
+3. **Stale .state after crash**: If an agent crashes after producing an artifact but before transitioning `.state`, the `.state` lags behind artifacts. The artifact heuristic fallback in `--audit` Category 2 catches this, but it's a recovery scenario not a normal path.
+
+## Verdict: PASS — no security or logic flaws that would compromise enforcement.