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automaton/tasks/state-file-enforcement/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md
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v2.0: state enforcement, project scoping, harness integration
State Enforcement (v2.0):
- .state file as single source of truth for task phase
- Approval gates for research, decomposition, design, test_design
- status.py --transition refuses illegal phase transitions
- status.py --validate-folder detects out-of-order artifacts
- status.py --audit checks all tasks for violations
- status.py --create-task is the only valid way to create tasks
- Pre-v2.0 tasks without .state are UNTRACKED -- all commands refuse them
- New --upgrade command bootstraps .state files for existing tasks

Project Scoping:
- --project flag added to all status.py commands across 16+ files
- _find_project_dir errors instead of silently falling back to ~/.automaton/
- --scope-check marks framework files OUT_OF_SCOPE when working on a project
- Dashboard handlers use stored project_root instead of re-detecting from CWD
- Prompts reference ~/.automaton/scripts/vram_detect.py (not {project}/.automaton/)

Harness Integration:
- status.py --can-edit now supports project-level checks (no --task required)
- --can-edit --file checks file scope without --task
- --json output for machine-readable harness integration
- opencode plugin (plugins/automaton-guard/plugin.ts) intercepts edit/write
- Git pre-commit hook (scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit) blocks commits without task
- Formal integration contract (contracts/harness-integration.md)

Other:
- upgrade.sh delegates to status.py --upgrade instead of manual heuristics
- Phase prompts reference --project {project} for multi-project scoping
- 200 tests passing (14 new)
2026-06-15 14:16:46 -04:00

1.1 KiB

Adversarial Bug Report: State File Enforcement

Deep Review

The .state file format and transition rules are robust. Approval sub-states create a hard gate that cannot be bypassed via --transition. Atomic writes via tmp+rename prevent corruption on crash.

Potential Issues

  1. Race condition on create: Two concurrent --create-task calls for the same name could both pass the "doesn't exist" check before one creates the directory. The atomic rename pattern mitigates this for .state writes but not for mkdir.

  2. Manual .state tampering: A user or agent could directly edit .state to write an invalid phase name. status.py handles this ("Unknown phase" error), but the error path could be clearer about what phases are valid.

  3. Stale .state after crash: If an agent crashes after producing an artifact but before transitioning .state, the .state lags behind artifacts. The artifact heuristic fallback in --audit Category 2 catches this, but it's a recovery scenario not a normal path.

Verdict: PASS — no security or logic flaws that would compromise enforcement.