# Harden Dashboard Security ## Goal Close the security gaps identified by the adversarial audit: missing CORS headers, filesystem-sourced task names that bypass validation, and unbounded content-length handling on POST. ## Requirements ### R1. Add CORS headers The dashboard serves no CORS headers. When bound to `0.0.0.0` (documented in `__main__.py`), any webpage can call the API — including approving/rejecting tasks via POST. **Fix**: In `DashboardHandler._send_json()` and `_send_error()`, add: - `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (or configurable via `--cors-origin`) - `Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS` - `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type` - Handle `OPTIONS` preflight requests for the review endpoint ### R2. Validate filesystem-sourced task names `discover_tasks()` at `task.py:248` reads directory names directly from `iterdir()`. The `_validate_task_name` regex only applies to API path parsing. A task directory created via `mkdir` with special characters (e.g., quotes, HTML) will be served to the JS client, which injects names into `onclick` attributes and `innerHTML`. **Fix**: In `discover_tasks()`, skip directories whose names contain characters outside `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`. Log a warning for invalid names. ### R3. Add content-length bound check on POST regardless of R2 from wire-dashboard-config Even if the caching task isn't done yet, add a quick defensive check: - If `Content-Length` header > `MAX_POST_BODY`, return 413 - If `Content-Length` header is missing or <= 0, return 400 ### R4. Escape task names in JS HTML injection points In `dashboard.js:renderDetail()`, `renderTaskCard()`, and `renderTimeline()`, task names are interpolated into HTML. While R2 prevents most dangerous names, defense in depth requires: - Use `escapeHtml()` on `task.display_name` before injection - Use `data-*` attributes instead of `onclick` for review buttons (pass task name via `dataset`) ### R5. Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header All responses should include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` to prevent MIME type sniffing. ## Acceptance Criteria - [ ] All API responses include `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header - [ ] `OPTIONS /api/task/{name}/review` returns 200 with appropriate CORS headers - [ ] Task directory named `task-with'quote` is excluded from `discover_tasks()` output - [ ] Task directory named `valid-task-123` is included - [ ] POST with `Content-Length: 1000000` returns 413 regardless of caching task status - [ ] `escapeHtml()` applied to `display_name` in all JS interpolation points - [ ] Review buttons use `data-task` attribute instead of inline `onclick` - [ ] All responses include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` ## Non-Goals - Not adding authentication (the dashboard is a local single-user tool) - Not adding HTTPS (out of scope for a dev tool) - Not rate-limiting (single-user, single-threaded server)