Restore archived tasks, fix dashboard scroll-reset, bind ornith, add Playwright smoke test

- **Restore 82 completed tasks** from tasks/complete/ back to tasks/ top
  level (all <7 days old per the cleanup policy; premature bulk archive
  was fixed).
- **Dashboard: fix scroll-reset on auto-refresh** — renderBoard rebuilds
  the board via innerHTML every 2s, destroying each column-body's
  scrollTop. Now snapshots column-body scrollTop + board.scrollLeft +
  view.scrollTop before rebuild and restores after (matched by
  PHASE_GROUPS index).
- **Dashboard UI additions** (pre-existing unstaged work): approval
  section cards, transition buttons, inline artifact editor (textarea for
  writing missing SPEC/VERDICT/etc from the detail modal).
- **Bind ornith as Implement model** — config.md: Model explicit to
  omlx/Ornith-1.0-35B-4bit-mlx, context window 32768. Interactive
  autopilot already used ornith via opencode default; now explicit.
- **Fix cleanup stub** — automaton-cleanup.sh had a stale --project arg
  pointing at a pytest temp dir (test isolation leak). Rewired to point
  at ~/.automaton.
- **Fix plist-isolation test** — test asserted host plist doesn't exist,
  but a real install creates it. Now snapshots mtime before run, asserts
  unchanged after (only a write during the test counts as bleed).
- **New Playwright smoke test** (tests/test_dashboard_ui.py) — 2 tests:
  board renders tasks, column scroll survives auto-refresh tick.
  Verified the test fails without the scroll fix (scrollTop resets to 0).
  Skipped via importorskip when playwright is absent (main CI stays
  green).
- **Clarify SI loop scope in README** — new-project onboarding section
  documents the framework-scoped self-improvement loop and options
  (leave/pause/create project loop).
- **CHANGELOG** documents all changes including the known model-divergence
  gap (mde tasks marked complete but per-role model binding was never
  implemented).

tasks/harden-enforcement-layers/ADVERSARIAL_BUG_REPORT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Adversarial Bug Report — harden-enforcement-layers
+
+## Attack Vectors
+1. **Hook bypass**: Can a user bypass the pre-push hook?
+2. **Symlink attacks**: Does `install-hooks.sh` follow symlinks unsafely?
+3. **Command injection**: Does `register-guards.sh` have injection vectors in its Python inline script or pi install call?
+
+## Findings
+- Pre-push hook can be bypassed with `--no-verify` (documented), but this is by design — it's a deterrent layer
+- `install-hooks.sh` uses `cp` not `ln -sf` — no symlink following risk
+- `register-guards.sh` passes `$OPENCODE_SOURCE` and `$PI_SOURCE` to Python/pi — these are hardcoded framework paths, not user input. Safe.
+- Python inline script uses `$OPENCODE_CONFIG` which could theoretically contain special chars, but this is a framework path from a controlled location
+
+## Verdict
+No exploitable vulnerabilities found.