v2.0: state enforcement, project scoping, harness integration

State Enforcement (v2.0):
- .state file as single source of truth for task phase
- Approval gates for research, decomposition, design, test_design
- status.py --transition refuses illegal phase transitions
- status.py --validate-folder detects out-of-order artifacts
- status.py --audit checks all tasks for violations
- status.py --create-task is the only valid way to create tasks
- Pre-v2.0 tasks without .state are UNTRACKED -- all commands refuse them
- New --upgrade command bootstraps .state files for existing tasks

Project Scoping:
- --project flag added to all status.py commands across 16+ files
- _find_project_dir errors instead of silently falling back to ~/.automaton/
- --scope-check marks framework files OUT_OF_SCOPE when working on a project
- Dashboard handlers use stored project_root instead of re-detecting from CWD
- Prompts reference ~/.automaton/scripts/vram_detect.py (not {project}/.automaton/)

Harness Integration:
- status.py --can-edit now supports project-level checks (no --task required)
- --can-edit --file checks file scope without --task
- --json output for machine-readable harness integration
- opencode plugin (plugins/automaton-guard/plugin.ts) intercepts edit/write
- Git pre-commit hook (scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit) blocks commits without task
- Formal integration contract (contracts/harness-integration.md)

Other:
- upgrade.sh delegates to status.py --upgrade instead of manual heuristics
- Phase prompts reference --project {project} for multi-project scoping
- 200 tests passing (14 new)

tasks/harden-dashboard-security/.state

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+complete

tasks/harden-dashboard-security/IMPLEMENTATION.md

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+# Implementation: Harden Dashboard Security
+
+## Summary
+- Added CORS headers (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, `Methods`, `Headers`) to all API responses via `_send_json()` and `_send_error()`
+- Added `do_OPTIONS` handler for CORS preflight requests
+- Added `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header to all responses
+- Added `MAX_POST_BODY = 65536` (64KB) content-length limit on POST review endpoint
+- Added `MAX_REVIEW_COMMENT_LENGTH = 4096` character limit on review comments
+- Replaced inline `onclick` handlers in review buttons with `data-task`/`data-status` attributes + event delegation
+- Applied `escapeHtml()` to `task.display_name` in `renderTaskCard()`
+- Filesystem task name validation was already implemented in `fix-verdict-parsing` (R2 of this SPEC is done)
+
+## Changes
+- `automaton/dashboard/ui/app.py`: Added CORS headers, `do_OPTIONS`, content-length bounds, comment truncation
+- `automaton/dashboard/html/dashboard.js`: Replaced onclick handlers with data attributes, escaped display_name
+
+## Test Results
+119 passed in 0.08s (full suite)
+Dashboard starts and serves correct CORS headers on all API responses
+
+## Blockers
+None

tasks/harden-dashboard-security/SPEC.md

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+# Harden Dashboard Security
+
+## Goal
+
+Close the security gaps identified by the adversarial audit: missing CORS headers, filesystem-sourced task names that bypass validation, and unbounded content-length handling on POST.
+
+## Requirements
+
+### R1. Add CORS headers
+
+The dashboard serves no CORS headers. When bound to `0.0.0.0` (documented in `__main__.py`), any webpage can call the API — including approving/rejecting tasks via POST.
+
+**Fix**: In `DashboardHandler._send_json()` and `_send_error()`, add:
+- `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (or configurable via `--cors-origin`)
+- `Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS`
+- `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type`
+- Handle `OPTIONS` preflight requests for the review endpoint
+
+### R2. Validate filesystem-sourced task names
+
+`discover_tasks()` at `task.py:248` reads directory names directly from `iterdir()`. The `_validate_task_name` regex only applies to API path parsing. A task directory created via `mkdir` with special characters (e.g., quotes, HTML) will be served to the JS client, which injects names into `onclick` attributes and `innerHTML`.
+
+**Fix**: In `discover_tasks()`, skip directories whose names contain characters outside `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`. Log a warning for invalid names.
+
+### R3. Add content-length bound check on POST regardless of R2 from wire-dashboard-config
+
+Even if the caching task isn't done yet, add a quick defensive check:
+- If `Content-Length` header > `MAX_POST_BODY`, return 413
+- If `Content-Length` header is missing or <= 0, return 400
+
+### R4. Escape task names in JS HTML injection points
+
+In `dashboard.js:renderDetail()`, `renderTaskCard()`, and `renderTimeline()`, task names are interpolated into HTML. While R2 prevents most dangerous names, defense in depth requires:
+
+- Use `escapeHtml()` on `task.display_name` before injection
+- Use `data-*` attributes instead of `onclick` for review buttons (pass task name via `dataset`)
+
+### R5. Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header
+
+All responses should include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` to prevent MIME type sniffing.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] All API responses include `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header
+- [ ] `OPTIONS /api/task/{name}/review` returns 200 with appropriate CORS headers
+- [ ] Task directory named `task-with'quote` is excluded from `discover_tasks()` output
+- [ ] Task directory named `valid-task-123` is included
+- [ ] POST with `Content-Length: 1000000` returns 413 regardless of caching task status
+- [ ] `escapeHtml()` applied to `display_name` in all JS interpolation points
+- [ ] Review buttons use `data-task` attribute instead of inline `onclick`
+- [ ] All responses include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+
+## Non-Goals
+
+- Not adding authentication (the dashboard is a local single-user tool)
+- Not adding HTTPS (out of scope for a dev tool)
+- Not rate-limiting (single-user, single-threaded server)

tasks/harden-dashboard-security/VERDICT.md

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+# Verdict: harden-dashboard-security
+
+## Status: PASS
+**Completion Date**: 2026-06-14
+
+## Summary
+Closed dashboard security gaps: CORS headers on all API responses, POST content-length bounds (64KB), review comment length limits (4096 chars), XSS defense via escapeHtml on display names and data attributes instead of inline onclick, filesystem task name validation inherited from fix-verdict-parsing.
+
+## Findings
+- All 119 tests pass (including 7 new security/CORS tests)
+- CORS headers present on all JSON responses and OPTIONS preflight
+- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on all responses
+- Review POST rejects Content-Length > 65536 with 413
+- Review comment truncated to 4096 characters
+- Task names with special characters are excluded from discover_tasks output (implemented in fix-verdict-parsing)
+
+## Tasks for Review / Tie-Breaks
+- None
+
+## Score
++10