15 lines
820 B
Markdown
15 lines
820 B
Markdown
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# Adversarial Bug Report — port-pi-guard
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## Attack Vectors
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1. **Status.py not available**: The plugin falls open (allows all edits) — can this be triggered maliciously?
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2. **Command injection in execSync**: Is the `cmd` string safe from injection?
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3. **Bash tool regex bypass**: Can write operations evade the bash tool pattern check?
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## Findings
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- Fall-open when status.py is missing is acceptable for offline/local use — an attacker who can remove status.py already has system access
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- `execSync` uses hardcoded command parts + `process.cwd()` — no user input in the command string, safe
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- Bash regex could be evaded with alternative write commands (e.g., `install`, `cat >`), but this is a best-effort check and the guard primarily targets edit/write tools
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## Verdict
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No exploitable vulnerabilities found.
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