58 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
58 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
|
# Harden Dashboard Security
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
## Goal
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Close the security gaps identified by the adversarial audit: missing CORS headers, filesystem-sourced task names that bypass validation, and unbounded content-length handling on POST.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
## Requirements
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
### R1. Add CORS headers
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
The dashboard serves no CORS headers. When bound to `0.0.0.0` (documented in `__main__.py`), any webpage can call the API — including approving/rejecting tasks via POST.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
**Fix**: In `DashboardHandler._send_json()` and `_send_error()`, add:
|
||
|
|
- `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (or configurable via `--cors-origin`)
|
||
|
|
- `Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS`
|
||
|
|
- `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type`
|
||
|
|
- Handle `OPTIONS` preflight requests for the review endpoint
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
### R2. Validate filesystem-sourced task names
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
`discover_tasks()` at `task.py:248` reads directory names directly from `iterdir()`. The `_validate_task_name` regex only applies to API path parsing. A task directory created via `mkdir` with special characters (e.g., quotes, HTML) will be served to the JS client, which injects names into `onclick` attributes and `innerHTML`.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
**Fix**: In `discover_tasks()`, skip directories whose names contain characters outside `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`. Log a warning for invalid names.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
### R3. Add content-length bound check on POST regardless of R2 from wire-dashboard-config
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Even if the caching task isn't done yet, add a quick defensive check:
|
||
|
|
- If `Content-Length` header > `MAX_POST_BODY`, return 413
|
||
|
|
- If `Content-Length` header is missing or <= 0, return 400
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
### R4. Escape task names in JS HTML injection points
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
In `dashboard.js:renderDetail()`, `renderTaskCard()`, and `renderTimeline()`, task names are interpolated into HTML. While R2 prevents most dangerous names, defense in depth requires:
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
- Use `escapeHtml()` on `task.display_name` before injection
|
||
|
|
- Use `data-*` attributes instead of `onclick` for review buttons (pass task name via `dataset`)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
### R5. Add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
All responses should include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` to prevent MIME type sniffing.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
## Acceptance Criteria
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
- [ ] All API responses include `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header
|
||
|
|
- [ ] `OPTIONS /api/task/{name}/review` returns 200 with appropriate CORS headers
|
||
|
|
- [ ] Task directory named `task-with'quote` is excluded from `discover_tasks()` output
|
||
|
|
- [ ] Task directory named `valid-task-123` is included
|
||
|
|
- [ ] POST with `Content-Length: 1000000` returns 413 regardless of caching task status
|
||
|
|
- [ ] `escapeHtml()` applied to `display_name` in all JS interpolation points
|
||
|
|
- [ ] Review buttons use `data-task` attribute instead of inline `onclick`
|
||
|
|
- [ ] All responses include `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
## Non-Goals
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
- Not adding authentication (the dashboard is a local single-user tool)
|
||
|
|
- Not adding HTTPS (out of scope for a dev tool)
|
||
|
|
- Not rate-limiting (single-user, single-threaded server)
|